Good Recordkeeping Plays Important Role in Funding Success
April 17, 2015CPA Yoel Wagschal recently started working with a syndicator who relied on Excel spreadsheets to track all his deals. The syndicator thought he had everything in tip-top shape, but it turns out that his system was hard for an outsider to understand and the data didn’t reconcile with his bank statements.
Wagschal, who heads an accounting firm in Monroe, New York, comes across this problem frequently these days. It’s been exacerbated by the exponential growth of the alternative funding industry in recent years. There are a sizeable number of alternative funders that started out small and have grown by leaps and bounds, yet they are still using rudimentary systems to keep track of their business dealings. In most cases, funders want to do the right thing, but they don’t always know how or the extent of what’s involved. Unknowingly these funders may be setting themselves up for financial or legal troubles.
“Sooner rather than later you are going to find yourself swimming in the Atlantic Ocean without any plan on how to get out of there,” Wagschal says.
Although newbie funders may be able to get by with simple tools and minimal staff, more sophisticated efforts are required once they are doing multiple transactions a month. It’s one thing when you are tracking a few daily deals on a spreadsheet. It’s quite another when you’re trying to keep track of all the moving parts for hundreds of deals.
What’s more, there’s a lot of slicing and dicing of data that goes into properly understanding your existing business and growth possibilities. If you don’t use the right tools to help you keep precise records, it’s nearly impossible to understand the fundamentals of your business in order to grow. Excel, while a useful tool, has its limits, and funders who rely exclusively on spreadsheets don’t get the benefits of other more sophisticated options that have become available to them in the past few years. Manually entering data also increases the possibility of human error, which can lead to thousands upon thousands of lost revenue for a funder’s business.
The Pitfalls of Not Keeping Good Data
Keeping good data is especially important to funders who want to take on additional investors or who are considering a sale at some point. Kim Anderson, chief executive of Longitude Partners Inc., a strategic advisory firm in Tampa, Florida, works with a number of funders that are looking to facilitate additional growth by bringing on outside investors. Many of these companies find themselves scrambling because they don’t readily have access to the kind of information potential investors want.
Not keeping good books can also inhibit a funder’s ability to expand into additional markets. Say a funder wants to introduce a new product or migrate a product offering to a different vertical. Companies that don’t analyze their data effectively may have a hard time understanding what part of their existing portfolio would be the most appropriate or profitable segment to introduce the product to, Anderson says.
Potentially impeding growth is bad enough, but funders that don’t keep proper books can also find themselves embroiled in legal or tax troubles. Some MCA providers, for instance, have faced stiff penalties for treating transactions as loans on their books instead of the purchase and sale of future income.
“If they are showing the revenue recognition in the exact same way that loan industry companies are doing, then they are setting themselves up to be judged in the same way that a loan company would,” says Christina Joy Tharp, a staff accountant in Wagschal’s office. If you’re using the same accounting methods as lenders, you could be deemed a predatory lender by multiple enforcement agencies, even if that’s not your intent, she says.
The strength of your business can also be significantly impacted by how you classify performing and nonperforming loans or receivables. “There are thousands of pages of rules on how banks have to classify performing and non-performing loans. None of that exists for this industry, which is completely unregulated,” says Alex Gemici, managing director and head of M&A at World Business Lenders, an alternative lending company in Manhattan.
As a result, funders don’t have a universal way of keeping their books. Many funders believe that as long as they are collecting sporadic payments, a loan or receivable should be classified as performing. Gemici strongly disagrees, saying this approach sets up a funder for potential failure given that the default rate for loans/receivables is about one in five. “It’s one thing to show on your books that loans or receivables are performing, it’s another when you run out of cash,” Gemici says.
Choosing an Outside Provider
Recognizing that Excel spreadsheets can only carry a funder so far and that out-of-the-box software probably won’t be a complete solution for alternative funders, a small number of companies have stepped up to provide customized solutions for the industry. MCA funders—where the perceived need is greatest—are a particular focus for these providers.
Benchmark Merchant Solutions, a processor in Amherst, New York, is one such company honing in on the MCA funder space. In 2014 the company launched MCA Track, software that’s designed to help MCA funders with their recordkeeping needs. It also helps them keep track of their income for tax purposes.
Among other things, MCA Track allows funders to view their performance at a glance. It shows them, for example, how merchants are performing, how the funds are allocated according to syndicator, the status of a deal, open cash advances, closed cash advances and defaulted cash advances. Funders can also get profitability data and other types of big picture information about their business as well. The software costs about $2,000 a month depending on the user’s size.
Benny Silberstein, chief operating officer of Benchmark, says the software was created because the processing company found that funders were often asking Benchmark to get data for them, especially when there were discrepancies. It can be real headache for funders to wade through inconsistencies with merchants, syndicators and ISOs, Silberstein says. “I can’t begin to tell you how many times funders asked us for a list of all the payments they’d received.”
PSC of Port Washington, New York, is another company trying to help MCA funders keep better records and manage their business more effectively. For a monthly membership fee, the company offers a front-end to back-end relationship management solution that allows funders to track all their contacts, documents, deals and commissions. Daily reports provide detailed data and summary information about an MCA’s funding business. The data includes the actual advance amount, the right to receive amount, the factor rate, processing fees, daily debits and credits, commissions paid to outside brokers or their own people, other management fees, ACH fees, wiring fees, payments, missing payments, collections information and participation with other syndicates.
The product has been on the market for about two years and the monthly fee varies according to a funder’s size, says Tom Nix, director of sales for PSC. He declined to be more specific about cost.
“The companies that are small and just starting out—if they are just doing a few transactions a month—they could probably get by using a spreadsheet. But that’s only feasible if you have a few transactions that you’re doing per month. Once you’re growing, when you get up to 10, 20, 30, 100 deals, the management of data becomes truly uncontrollable,” says Nix, who has seen a number of funders struggling to stay afloat or exit the business entirely because of their inability to keep good records.
“If you don’t have the right information and understand it, you’re going to give money to someone and you won’t [necessarily] get it back,” Nix says.
It’s possible for funders to set up their own infrastructure, but it can be costly and some feel it detracts from their ability to generate new business. That’s why Anthony Mannino, president of Nulook Capital in Massapequa, New York, chose to work with PSC. He researched the idea of doing all the back office and data collection on his own, but he decided not to reinvent the wheel since it would have meant hiring additional staff and would divert the company’s attention away from its primary focus—bringing in new business.
“A service provider like PSC gives us the ability to grow our company controlled and in a much quicker manner than we ever could than if we had to build our back end on our own,” Mannino says. “It takes most of the responsibility off of my company so we are able to focus on just growing the business and growing the sales.”
CloudMyBiz Inc. in Los Angeles is another company trying to service the alternative funder market, providing customized CRM systems for both lenders and MCA providers.
The CloudMyBiz system relies on a platform called Salesforce and is customized to the funding industry. It helps funders with the various facets of origination, underwriting and loan servicing. It helps them generate and track leads, automate funding workflow, understand and manage their deal pipeline and daily funding activities, collect and schedule recurring ACH payments and track syndication partners.
You could buy the Salesforce software and use it out of the box, but it provides only the basic functionality that funders need to run their business properly, says Henry Abenaim, principal consultant at CloudMyBiz. That’s where CloudMyBiz comes in by customizing the software for a funder’s specific business requirements. The fee varies widely, depending on the funder’s specifications, he says, declining to be more specific.
About two and a half years ago, Creative Vision Studio LLC in Long Beach, Calif., which had focused on the merchant credit card processing industry for more than a decade, also started offering a CRM system to MCA providers. The software is called Bankcard Pros CRM and customers can use it for merchant credit card processing, MCA or both. The software automates the data entry, underwriting, approval, funding and payback process from start to finish, says Robert Hendrix, the company’s chief executive. Funders also have access to 17 different management reports so they can track the performance and profitability of their entire portfolio per month.
The company charges an upfront fee of $4,000 to $5,000 to use the software, which is customized to a particular client’s business. There’s a $399 monthly fee after that. While it may seem costly to some funders, Hendrix says the software pays for itself within a month because of the efficiencies created. Importantly, the software eliminates the possibility of costly human mistakes that can occur in manually updating daily payments on a spreadsheet. “One little mistake can cost funders $2,000 to $3,000, even up to $10,000. They can be very costly mistakes,” he says.
It is, of course, possible for funders to keep good books and records using homegrown systems and personnel, and funders need to carefully weigh their options, taking into account that doing it right will probably require a meaningful investment in infrastructure and personnel. Whether they do it alone or hire an outside vendor, the important thing for funders is to collect the data and be able to evaluate it and display it in a way that makes sense to them, their customers, tax preparers, potential investors and others who need access.
Funders also need to remember that being successful in the business over the long term requires them to do more than simply capture accurate data. Beyond that, funders need to be able to manipulate the information in a way that helps them understand the nuts and bolts of their specific business, says Anderson of Longitude Partners.
“They may be able to produce enough financial information to complete an accurate tax return, but when it comes to understanding their operating metrics, they may not have collected or evaluated all of the right information to answer questions about what really drives the growth or sustainable profitability of the business,” he says.
Is NAMAA Reborn? Meet the Small Business Finance Association
April 14, 2015Almost seven years ago exactly, the North American Merchant Advance Association announced their presence. As of today, they are now officially the Small Business Finance Association (SBFA). Back then, a release dated April 15, 2008 stated:
The North American Merchant Advance Association, Inc. (NAMAA) has recently been created to represent merchant cash advance providers and to promote competition and efficiency throughout the merchant advance industry. NAMAA’s members will have the opportunity to share industry education and professional development, ethical standards and best practices guidelines, the development of industry relevant products and services, and the engagement in regulatory and legislative advocacy.
Of the ten original members, a handful are no longer operating. NAMAA’s membership in 2008 arguably encompassed the entirety of the merchant cash advance industry sans AdvanceMe (now named CAN Capital). Today, the SBFA website currently lists seventeen members. The organization has clearly grown but it pales in comparison to the size of the industry in 2015.
Internal data indicates that there are well over one hundred direct providers of merchant cash advance. Several hundred more are ISOs/brokers that co-invest in merchant cash advance transactions (Strategic Funding Source has had more than 200). And there are more than one thousand ISO/brokers that resell the product nationwide.
On this basis alone, less than two percent of industry providers and resellers are members of the trade organization. Granted, the seventeen member companies likely make up at least 15% of the industry’s funding volume. Member company Merchant Cash and Capital for example, announced just last month that they had funded $1 billion since inception.
Some have viewed the organization’s membership as overly exclusive and resistant to change. A seasoned veteran of an ISO that wished to remain anonymous said prior to the organization’s announced changes that, “NAMAA served a purpose for a long time but as the industry has changed, they have not.”
Ironically, Goldin’s statement in today’s release couldn’t be any more well timed. “With the alternative financing industry growing exponentially into a multi-billion dollar industry, we felt it was time for the trade association to evolve with it and open itself up to all types of small business alternative financing providers hence the name change to Small Business Finance Association,” he said.
The shift clearly acknowledges the true dynamic of the industry’s growth, that it’s not all merchant cash advance anymore.
SBFA Vice President Jeremy Brown is quoted in the release as saying, “NAMAA started primarily as an association of merchant cash advance providers and has evolved into an association for all types of small business alternative financing – particularly those providers of business loans.”
But with lenders added to the mix of potential constitutents, is the SBFA a little light? The SBFA will now represent less than 1% of the companies selling or reselling merchant cash advances and business loans. In growing membership however, patience may perhaps be a virtue.
Jared Weitz, CEO of United Capital Source, said, “NAMAA is a beneficial association in the industry and should be choosy with who they let in.” As a broker, his company has historically not been eligible for membership.
Similarly, Chad Otar, Managing Partner of Excel Capital Management, whose company has also not been historically eligible for membership, said, “The aim of NAMAA is to help out our audience to understand and remember the information we stand for as funders and ISOs.”
Otar’s point belies a troubling trend, that many players in this industry disagree about what it is they stand for.
In a AltFinanceDaily Magazine article, titled, Stacking: Is it Tortious Interference?, Robert Cook, Cathy Brennan, and Kate Fisher of Hudson Cook, LLP delved into the industry’s most polarizing debate, the practice of entering into a cash advance transaction or loan knowing that the merchant has one or more open cash advances or loans with a competitor. They wrote:
On one side are companies that only originate first-position deals. These companies generally include a clause in their contracts prohibiting the merchant from obtaining another merchant cash advance or loan until the company receives all of the future receivables it has purchased or is fully repaid. First-position companies view stacking as a threat to recovery of money advanced or loaned to merchants. On the other side are companies that routinely offer second or third-position deals. These companies argue that merchants with adequate cash flow to support additional advances should be free to obtain them.
Though I did not ask the SBFA directly if the practice of stacking is an immediate disqualifier for membership, the organization has long been known to advocate against it. In Year of the Broker, Goldin commented that stacking litigation is underway.
Lawyers at Hudson Cook, LLP echoed the same. “In the last several months, at least two first position companies have sued their stacking competitors, claiming that stacking constitutes tortious interference with contractual relations,” they wrote.
The lawsuits come on the heels of the International Factoring Association (IFA) ban on merchant cash advance companies, citing tortious interference as the main driver.
After meeting with board members from both associations, the decision was made to deny membership to merchant cash advance businesses. This decision was based on numerous complaints and increased scrutiny that could negatively impact the factoring industry. By distancing ourselves from the merchant cash advance industry, we hope to diminish the chance of potential legislation.
-Commercial Factor July/August 2014
With several merchant cash advance companies left high and dry by the IFA, a potential leadership void has been created.
“As every industry evolves and shapes itself, some sort of governance and guidance is always needed,” said Otar. “This guidance is something that NAMAA holds itself responsible for,” he argued.
“The question is, can they reestablish themselves as a powerful voice that demands respect?” asked an industry veteran on the condition of anonymity.
Goldin assured me that the updated version of the organization’s best practices guide will be a public document.
Industry brokers like Otar are eager to comply with an established code of conduct and play any role they can in its creation. “Most of the business driven industry-wide is brought in through various ISO channels, which are the ones responsible in presenting the product offered by the funders to the end client,” he said.
That enthusiasm may be resonating with the SBFA. Goldin communicated that they are working towards different types of memberships, hinting at the possibility that brokers might one day be extended an invitation to join.
“We are exploring different levels of membership / pricing,” Goldin wrote in an email.
For the right price, they will likely find a lot of eager applicants.
A Return to the Fundamentals? (At Transact 15)
April 3, 2015
The Transact ’15 conference opened to a record crowd and there was no shortage of merchant cash advance players in attendance. Those facts were to be expected. And if you walked in and poked your head around, you might not have noticed anything to be different. Payment processors touted the latest mobile technology and at every turn security systems were being offered to prevent catastrophic breaches of cardholder data.
Everything looked normal… except the merchant cash advance companies.
Back to the fundamentals
Early on Wednesday, April 1st, CAN Capital kicked off a product announcement by raffling off free Apple watches. CAN’s new product is called TrakLoan, a revolutionary new loan program that allows merchants to repay via a split percentage of their credit card sales instead of fixed ACH.
April Fools?
The described advantage of TrackLoan is that there is no fixed term and that merchants only pay back at the pace that they generate card sales. Wait, Where have I heard of this before?
After slapping myself across the face a few times to make sure I hadn’t teleported to the year 2005, the rip in the space time continuum grew more apparent at the after parties.
Card processors Integrity Payment Systems, North American Bancard and Priority Payment systems are still among the hottest names in town for splits. The veteran MCA ISOs and funders are still boarding hoards of merchant accounts with them every month and are therefore building multi-million dollar residual portfolios in the process. It makes one wonder why so many people have turned their back on split-deals for the ACH methodology.
Years ago, merchant cash advance was a sideshow value-add that could be used to acquire what really mattered and what was reliably profitable, merchant accounts. Not everyone has forgotten that however.
Over at Strategic Funding Source, Vice President Hellen McQuain is heading up a new merchant services division. In The Business Strategist, an SFS periodical, McQuain speaks the native tongue of the payments industry: EMV, PCI, NFC, etc.. Few, if any, of today’s new entrants in merchant cash advance could identify what those acronyms stand for, let alone explain the current climate of adoption.
So, is it time to get back to the basics?
Over the last six months, I have heard more gripes from funders about how to align a broker’s interest with theirs, other than by offering the opportunity to syndicate of course. The question comes down to, how can you get a broker to care about the outcome of a deal?
The answer should be obvious. Pay half the commission upfront and the other half as part of an ongoing performance residual. That gives the broker a stake in the outcome without having to syndicate. This is not a novel idea. This was how the entire industry operated from 2005 to 2011.
Might brokers resist such a compensation plan today in an upfront-only world? Maybe. But the greatest resistance I sense from funders, especially new ones, is that automated residual payments are too complicated for their current accounting systems.
That of course begs another question. How can this possibly be? Despite the rapid growth in technology, there is an entire segment of the industry that is ill-equipped to handle transactions that were commonplace and scalable five years ago.
While today’s systems are impressive, there are times when it seems like yesterday’s advanced technology was lost in a great flood, along with all the scientific texts documenting how to build the powerful machines.
To add to this, some of today’s edgy ideas are not new. A monthly payment loan for example is not an innovative idea. Weekly payments might acquire the merchant that wouldn’t do daily payments. And monthly payments might get the merchant that wouldn’t do weekly payments. These stretched out programs might make you popular with merchant cash advance brokers that are used to selling daily payment products, but they’re in no way new. It’s a return to the basics.
In 2015 we may apparently be going full circle.
A Peek Inside Yellowstone Capital
April 1, 2015When the banks say ‘no,’ alternative financing companies are saying ‘yes,’ sometimes. While costs may run high, there is still a limit on risk that a lender like OnDeck Capital and their competitors can accept.
In January of 2011, Kabbage stated their approval rate on volume-eligible applicants was only 55%. In February of this year, they said it’s about 80%. And a year ago, CAN Capital CEO Dan DeMeo told Forbes their approval rate was almost 70%. Similarly, a Biz2Credit report estimated the approval rate for alternative lenders in 2014 to be around 64% on average.
This indicates that approximately 20% – 35% of small businesses are being declined yet again. These are America’s exiles and they don’t fit into the neat little underwriting boxes that alternative lenders have crafted. Being declined by an alternative lender does not necessarily mean the business isn’t healthy or viable, but rather it could be because they exhibit some characteristic that today’s risk algorithms disqualify. Volatile sales activity, short time in business, poor credit, and atypical SIC codes are just a few of the reasons that a business could be rejected by a lender like OnDeck.
Consequently, an entire Plan C market has sprung up to service the small businesses that have been cast aside by the algorithms. And it’s huge. At the center of it all is Yellowstone Capital, a New York City-based merchant cash advance provider that has carved out its own niche. Founded in 2009, Yellowstone was one of a handful of pioneers that introduced ACH payments to an industry that relied entirely on split-processing.
Yellowstone does not publish their annual funding volume, but according to insiders not authorized to speak on the record, the numbers dwarf many industry behemoths including Square Capital, a company that funded more than $100 million in the last twelve months. And there’s some interesting changes happening there behind the scenes.
Last year, Yellowstone gave up an equity stake to a New York-based hedge fund in exchange for capital. Just recently however, Yellowstone CEO Isaac Stern led a management buyout to reportedly better position themselves for growth.
As part of the arrangement led by Stern and backed by a private family office, the hedge fund has been bought out and Stern is the only remaining company co-founder to retain an equity stake.
Additionally, private equity turnaround expert Jeff Reece has come on as President. Reece is a former Director of Cogent Partners, a boutique, private equity-focused investment bank and advisory firm.
Josh Karp is remaining the company’s Chief Operating Officer.
Jake Weiser is staying on as General Counsel.
Above all, the changes are more than just a few new faces in management. Yellowstone has already rented an additional floor at 160 Pearl Street, bringing the total floors they occupy there now to three.
Notably, the company has endured some negative press in the past of which they are well aware, but they have no shortage of supporters. I contacted two ISOs that claim to have worked with them and asked for their opinion on the Yellowstone experience.
Len Gelman of Allied Capital Corp couldn’t say enough good things about his account manager there, “He fights for every deal I submit, no matter how small or how difficult it may be to get done,” said Gelman. “He always takes my calls and responds to my emails and texts no matter how late it may be.”
And Arty Bujan of Cardinal Equity said, “Working with Yellowstone opened a door of business for me that really wouldn’t have existed without their unique approach to funding what some may call less desirable merchants.”
With a new management team and strong capital backing, Stern and Reece appear to be laying the groundwork to scale.
According to company insiders, Yellowstone is also working to expand their box beyond just high risk businesses and plan to service the middle market risk class. That would in effect also make them a Plan B option.
Their new underwriting depth could spare business owners from that second ‘no.’
More Red for OnDeck (ONDK)
February 24, 2015
Back in the red?
It looked like the tide had finally turned. After 8 years and just in time for their IPO, OnDeck had pulled off their first quarterly profit, a meager amount of $354,000. But it was a start right? After their debut on the NYSE, the price swung heavily from a high of $28.98 to a low of $14.52. It closed at $19.37 right before the report was released.
OnDeck reported a $4.3 million loss for the 4th quarter and an $18.7 million loss for the year. Despite this, their margins are definitely improving.
The company issued $369 million in loans last quarter, bringing the 2014 total to $1.2 billion. Sales and marketing expenses doubled in 2014 over the prior year with CEO Noah Breslow and CFO Howard Katzenberg acknowledging on the call they’ve made a big go at TV and radio advertising.
Competition? What competition?
Noticeably, the average APR of loans originated in the fourth quarter was 51.2%, down from over 60% in Q4 of 2013.
One analyst asked if competitive pressures were leading to the reduction in interest rates but Breslow said that wasn’t the case. If anything their closing rate or “booking rate” has been improving and rates coming down is an initiative they’ve taken up on their own. Merchants are actually shopping less according to them.
“Overall this market is still characterized by extreme fragmentation,” Breslow said. “The behavior that we see with our customers is that they might research other competitive options online but then when they actually apply to OnDeck and receive that offer, they kind of have this bird in hand dynamic, and there’s so much search cost associated with going out and looking at other places and so much uncertainty around that, they typically just take that offer that OnDeck has provided to them.”
With their cost of capital down, closing rate up, and defaults steady, a net loss should arguably be a tough pill to swallow. In response to a question about potential regulatory threats, Breslow said there wasn’t really anything on the horizon.
So was it just a weird quarter? Under Guidance for First Quarter 2015 and Full Year 2015 in their quarterly report, they suggest another long year of losses ahead.
To infinity and beyond!
The economic and regulatory environments couldn’t be any more favorable to a company that now has almost a decade worth of data under its belt. But unfettered growth still seems to be the number one priority on the agenda. Breslow and Katzenberg spoke optimistically about their recent entry in the Canadian market and the potential to set up shop in other countries. As for the OnDeck Marketplace… surprisingly they claimed its only real purpose is to diversify their funding sources. They are not aiming to become a marketplace but rather they view the OnDeck Marketplace as just one of many vehicles to sell off loans.
So when does the profit part come in? None of the analysts on the line asked about profit. They mostly all offered their congratulations on a “great quarter”. Coincidentally they were almost all from companies that originally underwrote their stock offering.
Six months ago I wrote that OnDeck’s lack of profits has been intentional. In An Insider’s Perspective, I wrote, “What scares their competitors though, is that this strategy has been intentional. Very few if any players in the industry have had the luxury, guts, or the purse to lose money for seven years as part of a coup to conquer the market.” Nothing has changed.
As long as they have cash in the bank, they’re going to keep pursuing growth. They had $220 million in cash and cash equivalents as of December 31st. So for now that means continuing to turn up the marketing heat to increase volume domestically while planting seeds in other markets like Canada.
But the question remains, at what point does profitability become important? Sure it’s tempting to be lending $2 billion or $3 billion a year instead of the $1.2 billion size they’re at now because it would mean they’ll be that much bigger right? Heck, maybe they can be a $10 billion a year lender. But if they are running in the red at a moment where their cost of capital is low, the credit markets are liquid, the economy is favorable, regulatory threats are nil, defaults are static, there is supposedly no competition, and their margins are at their peak, then what happens when one or two of those things change? What if all those things change at once?
Those rates are too high low
OnDeck’s price jumped in afterhours trading. The market is chalking up the results as a positive. It’s just another losing quarter in a long line of losing quarters for OnDeck and they’ve promised more of the same in the year ahead. Nothing to see here folks, business as usual.
OnDeck may have made it easier for small businesses to get a loan, but they have yet to prove since 2006 if their methodology can actually make money. That should be a wake up call to critics that complain their interest rates are too high.
It is quite possible that their interest rates are actually too low. At an average of 51.2% APR, that’s a heck of a theory to consider.
But it looks like it’s true.
On Deck Capital IPO, An Insider’s Perspective
August 16, 2014It was August 23, 2011, the day the Virginia Earthquake could be felt all the way up in New York City. The four of us were enjoying outdoor seating at a restaurant on the Upper East Side. The ground shook, my drink spilled and Ace looked at each one of us and said, “Okay so I’m putting you down for five deals this month.” OnDeck Capital’s relationship managers were aggressive. If you were a small Independent Sales Organization (ISO), they didn’t expect to get all of your dealflow so they roped you in little by little. It was hard to say no. If five deals was too much, Ace would say three and if three was too much, then he’d put you down for three anyway. Zero was not in the cards. OnDeck owned a specific niche and if you didn’t send your premium credit clients to them, then any ISOs you were competing against would. That was a death knell in those days. Just a few years earlier I would’ve shrugged them off, but public sentiment was changing. Merchants were embracing the fixed daily payment methodology and the merchant cash advance industry would never be the same.
OnDeck Capital is now going public. Will you buy stock?
I’m in a unique position to discuss OnDeck. I started my career in this industry before they even existed. I’ve competed against them as an underwriter at a rival firm, worked with them as a referral partner when I was in sales, and covered them in my capacity as Chief Editor of an industry trade publication.
I left my post as Merchant Cash & Capital’s Director of Underwriting in late 2008. I was 25, about a year or two older than the average employee in the industry. Several of MCC’s rivals got demolished in the financial crisis but OnDeck wasn’t one of them. They also weren’t much of a competitor either. Struggling to define themselves as the anti-merchant cash advance, their product ran counter to the spirit of the industry’s rise. The single biggest allure of a merchant cash advance wasn’t that it was easy to obtain but that there was no fixed repayment term. The funds came with a pre-determined net cost but no specific date on when the delivery of future sales would be due.
Outsiders like the news media aren’t exactly sure what separates merchant cash advance from OnDeck except for maybe the cost of funds. Cash advance just sounds expensive, doesn’t it?
Outsiders identify the company by three characteristics.
1. They’re a non-bank business lender
2. They’re more expensive than a bank
3. They’re a tech company
These bullet points gloss over the fact that OnDeck’s loans require payments to be made every day. Can you imagine a credit card company forcing you to send a payment every day of the month? Or your landlord asking for rent on the 1st of the month, the 2nd, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and so on every day until your lease is up?
This is not to say that this system is necessarily bad for borrowers, but that it is quite possibly the most unique and important part of what makes OnDeck different. It’s their secret sauce. It is why OnDeck gets lumped in with merchant cash advance companies in many conversations. OnDeck and the legion of copycats they have spawned are part of a broader industry that includes merchant cash advance companies. I call them daily funders. Daily funders provide financing on the condition that payments are made daily. I don’t call them daily lenders because traditional merchant cash advance products are not made by lenders, but by a unique group of investors that purchase future revenue streams.
Transition
Under company founder Mitch Jacobs, OnDeck had established themselves as the de facto loan option.
The merchant’s not biting on merchant cash advance? Send it to OnDeck. The merchant doesn’t accept credit cards? Send it to OnDeck.
They were every merchant cash advance ISO’s frenemy. They’d solicit you for your deals and then throw you under the bus to journalists as evil purveyors of expensive financing. They needed us to source dealflow and we needed them to maximize closing ratios but neither was quite satisfied with the arrangement.
When the company’s first employee took over as CEO in June 2012, the rhetoric changed. While still happy to be portrayed as the anti-merchant cash advance, OnDeck transformed their image from a niche Wall Street lender to a Silicon Valley-esque tech company. Noah Breslow was a curious choice. He has a BS from MIT and an MBA from Harvard Business School. He’s tall, charismatic, and he introduced vocabulary words such as algorithm to an industry that relied entirely on manual human underwriting.
At a recent lending conference, the younger crowd characterized Breslow as the Steve Jobs of business loans. He commands a cult-like following inside and outside the company, and in 2013 was embraced by New York City’s Mayor Bloomberg.
Breslow fast tracked OnDeck. With only $43 million raised in the first 5 years, the company went on to raise more than $300 million in the first 24 months under Breslow’s leadership.
This was their plan all along
In November 2012, OnDeck entertained a buyout offer from UK-based payday lender Wonga in which they reportedly received a $250 million valuation. The deal fell apart in the late stages but at the time I believed the negotiations were all a ploy for OnDeck to get a true market valuation. With a solid offer on the table, they knew both where they stood and where they needed to go. Last week the WSJ reported that preliminary IPO discussions valued them at $1.5 billion, six times higher than where they were two years ago.
With stock options being offered to new employees at least as far back as 2012, the plan to go public should come as no surprise. Later this year, those employees may actually get to do something very few startup workers ever get to do, convert those options into real shares.
So will OnDeck ride off into the sunset of billion dollar bliss? Not so fast say several industry insiders, some of whom are itching to short the stock on the first day they can.
Smoke and mirrors?
As OnDeck took advantage of the swing in public consensus (that fixed terms were better and lower costs increased the attactiveness ), insiders began to ask an important question. Why weren’t merchant cash advance companies collectively countering with lower prices to remain competitive? Greed was fingered by journalists especially in the wake of the financial crisis. But greed is a weak prerogative if you consider that merchant cash advance companies were filing for bankruptcy left and right in 2009.
And oddly or perhaps even ominously, an entire segment of merchant cash advance companies began to raise their prices just as OnDeck was lowering theirs. When I wrote The Fork in the Merchant Cash Advance Road in April 2011, I said:
While the margins earned on high credit accounts shrank, funding providers were dealing with another challenge simultaneously, defaults. Whether the business owner intentionally interfered with their credit card processing or the store went out of business altogether, bad debt in the MCA world was mounting…FAST!
Risk was and still is the number one reason that merchant cash advances cost so much. While it’s true that OnDeck serviced higher credit businesses, insiders speculated that the spreads were too thin. For years, OnDeck’s merchant cash advance competitors have doubted the soundness of their model.
It’s a debate that continues even to this day and yet OnDeck has secured hundreds of millions in investments from companies like Google Ventures, Goldman Sachs, Peter Thiel, and Fortress Investment Group. Their notes got an investment grade rating from DBRS. And as far as volume is concerned, they have likely eclipsed the industry’s all time reigning giant CAN Capital. If they had reached none of these milestones, OnDeck would have little credibility to convince critics of their sanity.
With a mountain of circumstantial evidence through big name backing in OnDeck’s favor, it seems to be indicative that the skeptics are wrong. But maybe they’re not. Could their model be both seriously flawed and superior at the same time?
It’s all about eyeballs
Going back to the 1990s, Internet companies have been judged, valued, and made famous by the price of eyeballs and the number of site visits. It’s a measure that’s never disappeared and according to USA Today is making a comeback. And while OnDeck Capital has always been based in New York City, true to their Silicon Valley form, their model has been to conquer market share first 
and take on profitability second. In their case, it’s not eyeballs or site visits, it’s loan origination volume.
Five months ago Breslow was quoted in the WSJ as saying OnDeck is “imminently profitable“. With seven years in business, it’s proof that their critics have been right all along, that their model doesn’t make money.
What scares their competitors though, is that this strategy has been intentional. Very few if any players in the industry have had the luxury, guts, or the purse to lose money for seven years as part of a coup to conquer the market. Disbelievers in this long term wildly risky strategy are salivating at the opportunity to inspect the company’s financial statements in the IPO.
In When Will the Bubble Burst?, RapidAdvance CEO Jeremy Brown, whose company became part of the Quicken Loans family last winter, fired shots at OnDeck, “To accomplish high growth rates, which may be driven by a desire or need for an IPO or to raise investment or to sell to private equity, assets are being overpaid for through higher than economically justified commissions (I’ve heard 12-15 points upfront from the more aggressive companies) and stretch the repayment term of the MCA or loan even further (On Deck24, I am talking about you).”
Insiders testify that OnDeck’s strategy has not so much been about lower costs but about growth at all costs. Among the evidence is the sudden removal of an industry-wide practice of verifying the business owner is current on their rent. Repayment terms are getting stretched out, commissions have shot up, and for a while they ran a program that allowed applicants to get funding with the submission of just a single bank statement.
Merchant cash advance companies look at their own default figures and scoff at the notion that OnDeck’s aggressive practices could produce low single digit defaults as they’ve publicly claimed.
Imminent
Through it all, there remains the fact that OnDeck has never claimed their methodologies to be profitable, at least not yet. Red ink at IPO time might reward their detractors with a certain delicious satisfaction, but what will they say if and when they become profitable?
I’m reminded of The 20 Smartest Things Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos ever said. Below is a few of them.
- “There are two kinds of companies: Those that work to try to charge more and those that work to charge less. We will be the second.”
- “Your margin is my opportunity.”
- “We’ve done price elasticity studies, and the answer is always that we should raise prices. We don’t do that, because we believe — and we have to take this as an article of faith — that by keeping our prices very, very low, we earn trust with customers over time, and that that actually does maximize free cash flow over the long term.”
- “If you never want to be criticized, for goodness’ sake don’t do anything new.”
- “Invention requires a long-term willingness to be misunderstood. You do something that you genuinely believe in, that you have conviction about, but for a long period of time, well-meaning people may criticize that effort. When you receive criticism from well-meaning people, it pays to ask, ‘Are they right?’ And if they are, you need to adapt what they’re doing. If they’re not right, if you really have conviction that they’re not right, you need to have that long-term willingness to be misunderstood. It’s a key part of invention.”
I wonder if the executive team at OnDeck would share these philosophies.
They’ve always claimed themselves to be a tech company, much to the bewilderment of their competitors. Will technology come through for them?
The data available on businesses has changed. Bank statements and a credit report might’ve been all there was to go on when the company first started, but in Automated Intelligence Breslow said, “the fact is most businesses operating today, in 2014, are already technology focused to one degree or another. They have computers, they have online banking, they use credit card processors, their customers are reviewing them online, there are public records, etc. All this electronic data helps paint a deeper and more accurate picture of the health of a business.”
With such easy access to important data, it might be possible that through the use of 2,000 data points, OnDeck doesn’t need to do all the manual investigations that their competitors still place high values on. The available data might be able to predict loan repayment success just as well as a human analyst.
And if that’s true, then they can reduce the cost of overhead as they scale. As their predictive algorithms get fed more data, they might be able to eliminate humans altogether. At the May 2014 LendIt conference, Breslow admitted that 30% of their loans were still manually underwritten but said that “if customers want full automation, we are prepared to deliver it.”
By that charge, a sustainable model should not be that far out of reach. Through advanced data analysis and decreasing fixed costs, profitability may indeed be imminent.
Winner
If the story of the merchant cash advance industry has been a race to the top, then OnDeck might be declared the winner in a successful IPO. It would be an ironic achievement for the company that positioned itself as the anti-merchant cash advance. In their wake today are hundreds of daily funders offering fixed payment products.
OnDeck’s critics are in a paradoxical position because a successful IPO is good for them too. They want to believe OnDeck’s model never worked, can’t work, and have it be proven a failure. But if it goes the other way, the legitimacy of the daily funder universe will be solidified in the mainstream. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.
As AmeriMerchant CEO David Goldin said to Inc, “the OnDeck IPO shows that Wall Street is now taking this industry seriously.”
So does that mean he’d buy stock? Somewhere out there at a restaurant in New York City, an OnDeck relationship manager is probably putting Goldin down for five shares.
Cue the earthquake, the industry will never be the same.
Curious how it will change it exactly? Read my magazine published prediction, The Retail Investor.
Should Licensing and Accreditation Come to MCA?
August 13, 2014
It’s not said often, but it has been suggested by some players in the merchant cash advance industry to introduce sales licensing requirements. Anybody can sell and broker MCAs or alternative business loans, even your mom.
That’s been a boon for growth but a bust for maintaining any kind of uniformity or standards. That’s a bad position to be in when influential political leaders are beginning to talk about oversight and regulation, even if it’s way too early to sound the alarm.
Earlier today, former SBA head Karen Mills published, Can Lending Technology Revive America’s Small Businesses? in which she states, “there is already concern that, if left unchecked, small business lending could become the next subprime lending crisis.”
One way to dispel future regulation is through self-licensing, much like the payments industry worked to pull off three years ago. For the first time ever, merchant account sales reps could take an official exam and become a CPP, a Certified Payment Professional. This originated when I was still directly selling merchant cash advances and along with it, merchant accounts.
Merchant accounts were the focus of my compensation strategy and I seriously considered taking the first ever CPP exam in 2011 even though it cost $350. I considered it solely on the basis of whether or not it would convince more people to change their merchant accounts. I finally decided to wait and see if it was helping others before jumping in myself. The question in my mind was, would merchants care? If not, then why busy myself with being accredited?
Now that three years have gone by, the Green Sheet is attempting to answer this question: Is the CPP Dead on Arrival? Members of their forum reported that accreditation had no teeth because the Electronic Transactions Association (ETA) which created it, lacks industry oversight authority. Others said it was a flawed idea from the beginning. And just as I expected to find, there is belief that merchants do not recognize it as meaningful, don’t know about it, or they don’t care.
The story concludes by saying there is hope since three years is too early to judge CPP adoption. Regardless of what will become of CPPs, today any person with access to a phone or the Internet can sell merchant accounts. If you don’t understand how interchange works or what it is, it doesn’t matter.
Ironically, in the very same Green Sheet issue there is a story that argues the secret to selling merchant accounts successfully is really just about having the right tone. Accreditation? What’s that? Interchange? Huh? Instead, ask the owner a few things about their business, “match your response as closely as possible to that of the merchant. Use similar words. Try to pause as the prospect paused.”
The advice touches upon an interesting aspect of sales, that your clients don’t necessarily care about how smart or knowledgeable you are about the subject matter. They’re buying YOU even if your product sucks. Compare that to say accounting where prepared financial statements need to be constructed in such a way to comply with IRS codes or law where a lawyer needs to be admitted to the Bar to practice. In those cases the clients can’t even receive the service unless the seller meets certain professional standards.
And that’s where accreditations become murky. As a business owner, you’re allowed to wildly overpay for printer ink and buy it from someone who doesn’t know anything about printers or ink. I’ve done it myself. I don’t care if they have a certificate in printing expertise or if they’re members of the National Ink Masters of America. Part of being a business owner means being automatically qualified to make transactional decisions.
The same can be applied to merchant accounts. Need to accept cards? Find a rep you like that can articulate what’s important to you. You can make a deal based on no intellectual substance or one completely dependent on it. If it’s not legally required to be a CPP, then the target audience needs a lot of convincing as to why it should be important to them.
Tom Waters and Ben Abel of Bank Associates Merchant Services are the writers behind the CPP DOA piece in Green Sheet and they admit that success in mainstreaming accreditation can and has taken up to 25 years in other industries. That of course brings me full circle to MCA and business lending. The enormity of self-licensing could take years or perhaps even decades to nail down. And even if they were instituted, would the merchants care? That’s the question I ask myself.
With virtually no outcry from merchants over best practices currently, I think the dream some have of becoming a CMCAP (Certified Merchant Cash Advance Professional) will have to be put on hold. Of course you could always be proactive and become a Certified Lender Business Banker, though I predict it would do nothing to help you in this business.
The reality is that we should expect to live with the status quo at least for now. My advice is to be honest, fair, and a good example for everyone else. Do that and we’ll never have to worry.
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Are We in a $300 Billion Market?
August 7, 2014
Earlier today on a large group conference call with Tom Green and Mozelle Romero of LendingClub, I learned a few more details about their business loan program. In the Q&A segment, one attendee came right out and asked if they believed their competition was merchant cash advance companies and online business lenders.
According to Green, it’s not so much other companies that they feel they are up against but more of the broad challenge of market awareness. Their struggle is about getting people to know that there are non-bank options available and to make people aware of their existence.
It’s the same challenge merchant cash advance (MCA) companies have been dealing with for more than a decade. Notably though, there are many in the MCA industry that feel the market is saturated and thus a lot of the industry’s growth has been fostered through a turf war for the same merchants. Stacking (the practice of funding merchants multiple advances or loans simultaneously) is partially spurred by a belief that there are no more untapped businesses left to fund. The acquisition costs of a brand new untouched business that is both interested and qualified is so high, that it is not a pursuit some funders and brokers can afford to take on.
Market Size
At present, daily funders, which are a combination of both MCA companies and lenders that require daily payments, are funding somewhere between $3-$5 billion a year. On the call Green said he believed the potential market was far larger than that, though he discredited the $200 billion figure that some independent research had predicted. That was only because LendingClub believes the potential market is substantially higher, more like $300 billion.
$300 billion?! That’s about 100x larger than the current daily funder market combined and starkly contradicts any belief that there’s no merchants out there who haven’t already gotten funded.
LendingClub’s minimum gross sales requirement is $6,250 a month and they have an upper monthly gross threshold on applicants at $830,000 a month, though they’ve had businesses apply who do even more than that. Their sweet spot as Green put it, is the segment doing $16,000 to $416,000 gross per month.
I can’t help but notice that’s the same sweet spot that daily funders have. And we mustn’t forget, LendingClub’s target business owner has at least 660 FICO. If it’s a $300 billion market for good credit applicants, then it’s got to be even bigger for the ultra FICO-lenient companies in MCA.
What’s a business?
LendingClub only needs someone with at least 20% ownership to both apply for and guarantee the loan, an unheard of stipulation in the rest of alternative business lending. One cardinal rule in MCA has been that there needs to be at least 51% or 80% ownership signing the contract. That’s had a lot to do with the fact that most MCA agreements are not personally guaranteed and the signatory is required to have absolute authority to sell the business’s future proceeds.
Summer of Fraud
In 2013 the MCA industry experienced what many insiders dubbed the summer of fraud. Spurred by advances in technology, small businesses were applying for financing en masse while armed with pristinely produced fraudulent bank statements. Fake documents overwhelmed the industry so hard that today it is commonplace for underwriters to verify their legitimacy with the banks. This is done manually or with the help of tools such as Decision Logic or Yodlee.
Knowing this firsthand, I asked LendingClub if they also take the care to verify bank statements. In the majority of cases they do not. They rely greatly on an algorithm that detects fraudulent answers on the application but the statements themselves are not scrutinized except in very high risk situations. Considering they’re wildly less expensive than MCAs, I find it odd that they are exposed to this type of risk. Fraudulent documents are the norm and in these underwriting conditions, I would expect them to charge as much or more than MCA companies, not less.
At the same time it’s important to mention that at present, business loans on their platform are only funded by institutional investors. Retail investors can only invest in consumer loans. LendingClub has been very transparent about excluding retail investors here for the very purpose of shielding them from unevaluated and unforeseen risk. My guess is that as time goes on, they will do more to validate the bank statements which is the bread and butter of assessing the risk and health of a business.
$300 billion
In a FICO flexible environment, it’s possible the potential for daily funders is at least $300 billion. If true, that would mean that for the 16 years that MCA players have been around, they barely reached even 1% of their target audience. I’ve been saying it since I’ve started this blog 4 years ago, every business owner I’ve spoken to has never heard of a merchant cash advance… which means saturation is a myth.
Tom Green was right, the real competition is public awareness. 99% of the potential market is untapped. If you’re fighting with 5 other companies over the same merchant, you gotta:
You gotta keep on looking now
Keep on looking now
You’re looking for love
In all the wrong places
